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How AN ENVIRONMENTAL COMMERCE CLAUSE
CHALLENGE PRESAGED THE DECISION OF CHIEF
JUSTICE ROBERTS IN NFIB V SEBELIUS

M. Reed Hopper
W A hile legal pundits search high and low to discover why Chief
Justice Roberts "Jumped the shark" on the individual mandate
in NFIB v. Sebelius,l the answer may lie in an overlooked 2003 case from
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.
In Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, the Court addressed a Commerce
Clause challenge to the Endangered Species Act. 2 A three-judge panel held
that the federal government's prohibition on taking a protected toad--a
noncommercial, intrastate species--was a valid regulation of interstate
commerce because the taking would result from a commercial activity.' On
petition for rehearing en banc, then-Judge Roberts expressed his opinion
that the panel was wrong on its Commerce Clause analysis.' According to
Judge Roberts:
The panel's opinion in effect asks whether the challenged
regulation substantially affects interstate commerce, rather
than whether the activity being regulated does so. Thus, the
panel sustains the application of the Act in this case
because Rancho Viejo's commercial
development
constitutes interstate commerce and the regulation
impinges on that development, not because the incidental

Reed Hopper is a Principal Attorney in Pacific Legal Foundation's Environmental Law Practice
Group. He oversees the foundation's Endangered Species Act Program and Clean Water Act Project.
1Nat'1 Fed'n of Indep. Bus. (NFIB) v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566 (2012).
2 See Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062 (D.C. Cir.
2003).
3 See id.

See Rancho Viejo, LLC, 334 F.3d at 1160 (Roberts,
banc).
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taking of arroyo toads can be said to be interstate
commerce.5

The Rancho Viejo decision foreshadowed Justice Roberts' interpretation
of the Affordable Care Act ("ACA") in NFIB v. Sebelius, a case that asked
whether the individual mandate regulated activity (or inactivity)
substantially affecting interstate commerce, or created such activity.6
In Rancho Viejo, Judge Roberts observed, "[t]he panel's approach in
this case leads to the result that regulating the taking of a hapless toad that,
for reasons of its own, lives its entire life in California constitutes regulating
'Commerce... . . . among the several States."" Judge Roberts concluded the
holding went too far, explaining, "Such an approach seems inconsistent
with the Supreme Court's holdings in United States v. Lopez and United
States v. Morrison," 8 wherein the Supreme Court held that federal

legislation prohibiting the possession of firearms in school zones and
violence against women was invalid under the commerce power. Citing the
Fifth Circuit, Judge Roberts explained, "looking primarily beyond the
regulated activity [would] . . . effectually obliterate' the limiting purpose of

the Commerce Clause."'
Based on this analysis, it should have been no surprise that Chief
Justice Roberts would conclude that the individual mandate in the ACA
had exceeded the constitutional limitation to regulate commerce.10 As he
explained in NFIB v. Sebelius, "[t]he Government's theory here would
effectively override that [Commerce Clause] limitation, by establishing that
individuals may be regulated under the Commerce Clause whenever
enough of them are not doing something the Government would have

I1d.
Nat'1 Fed'n of Indep. Bus. (NFIB) v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566, at 2587 (2012).
Rancho Viejo, LLC, 334 F.3d at 1160 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3).
'Id. (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598 (2000).
' Rancho Viejo, LLC, 334 F.3d at 1160 (citing GDF Realty Inv., Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622,
634-35 (5th Cir. 2003)).
'oNFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2591.
6
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them do."" Accordingly, "[s]uch a law cannot be sustained under a clause
authorizing Congress to 'regulate Commerce.'l 2
It is Judge Roberts's final comment in Rancho Viejo that, in light of the
NFIB v. Sebelius decision, gives pause. In urging the entire Court of
Appeals to review the panel's faulty Commerce Clause analysis, he stated,
"[s]uch review would . . . afford the opportunity to consider alternative

grounds for sustaining application of the Act that may be more consistent
with Supreme Court precedent."' That simple statement held far more
meaning for Judge Roberts than it originally appeared. It was no passing
remark; instead, it was a statement of Judge Roberts's strongly held judicial
philosophy that courts should uphold federal legislation whenever possible.
Chief Justice Roberts's recasting of the individual mandate penalty as a "tax"
demonstrated that it is almost always possible to uphold federal legislation
when the court is willing to rewrite the law.' 4 Perhaps surprisingly, this is
not the first time we have seen such an inclination from Chief Justice
Roberts.
When Chief Justice Roberts was appointed in 2005, one of the first
cases the new Court took up for review was Rapanos v. United States.15 In
that case, John Rapanos, represented by Pacific Legal Foundation, raised a
Commerce Clause challenge to the Clean Water Act.'" The Court did not
address the Commerce Clause issue. Instead, the new Roberts Court
avoided a constitutional conflict altogether by reinterpreting the Act and
limiting federal jurisdiction that would otherwise exceed the commerce
power." The plurality opinion, authored by Justice Scalia and joined by
Justices Thomas, Alito, and Roberts, was a clear compromise that showed
the hand of the Chief Justice. Whereas the Clean Water Act prohibits
unpermitted discharges into "navigable waters," defined in the Act only as
"waters of the United States," the plurality parsed the word "waters"" in
n Id. at 2588.
Id. at 2591.
" Rancho Viejo, LLC, 334 F.3d at 1160.
14 NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at
2600.
1s Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
12

16 id.

o

See id at 739.

'Id. at 753.
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much the same way that Chief Justice Roberts parsed the word "tax" in
NFIB v. Sebelius. Based on the Court's hyper-technical reading of that
word, the plurality in Rapanos expanded the traditional meaning of
"navigable waters," as highways of commerce, to include non-navigable
tributaries to such waters." This was a narrower reading of the Act than the
government championed, and effectively allowed the plurality to rewrite the
Act.
In a separate concurring opinion, Chief Justice Roberts chastised the
Corps of Engineers and the Environmental Protection Agency for not
adopting meaningful limits on agency authority under the Clean Water
Act.2 0 It is curious, however, that the Chief Justice put the entire onus of
defining the scope of federal legislation on the enforcement agencies, rather
than on Congress. Although this was the third time the Court had to
address federal jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act, and Chief Justice
Roberts acknowledged some ambiguity in the Act itself 21 Justice Roberts
did not urge Congress to clarify the statutory language despite a majority on
the Court in disagreement on where the limits on agency authority should
be drawn. Perhaps, in retrospect, this can be seen as an indication of Chief
Justice Roberts's aversion to challenge congressional intent, as demonstrated
for all to see in NFIB v. Sebelius.
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Id.

1Id. at
21id.
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